'The World Is Bigger Than Five': What Does Türkiye Want from UN Security Council Reform?

Why It Matters

Türkiye wants a Security Council whose composition and decision-making reflect today's world rather than 1945, and it expresses that aim in the phrase 'The world is bigger than five.' Ankara's reform doctrine targets the veto, the lack of regional representation, and the legitimacy gap that opens when a handful of states decide crises affecting everyone. It also rejects solutions that simply add more permanent seats, arguing that rotation and accountability are fairer than new privileges.

The debate matters beyond diplomacy. Council decisions on sanctions, peacekeeping and the use of force are legally binding on all UN members under Article 25 of the Charter, so who sits at the table, and who can block action, shapes outcomes from Gaza to Ukraine.

Background

The Security Council's structure comes directly from the UN Charter, signed in 1945, and has changed only once.

How the Council is built

• Composition (Article 23): Five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and, since 1965, ten elected non-permanent members serving two-year terms, with no immediate re-election. The original Charter had six non-permanent seats; the enlargement to ten took effect on 31 August 1965.
• Voting (Article 27): Substantive decisions need nine affirmative votes out of fifteen, including the concurring votes of all permanent members. This is the origin of the 'veto,' though the word does not appear in the Charter.
• Amendment (Articles 108 and 109): Changes require a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of member states, including all five permanent members.
• Regional imbalance: The Council's make-up still reflects 1945. Africa, which accounts for a large share of the Council's agenda, has no permanent seat, and neither do Latin America and the Caribbean. Asia-Pacific representation is also widely considered inadequate.

Reform timeline

Year	Milestone
1945	UN Charter enters into force with five permanent and six non-permanent members
1965	Non-permanent seats rise from six to ten (the only enlargement to date)
1993	General Assembly creates an Open-Ended Working Group on Council reform
2005	World Summit Outcome calls for early reform; the G4 draft resolution is tabled but never put to a vote; the African Union adopts the Ezulwini Consensus
2009	Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) begin in the General Assembly
2022	Resolution 76/262 requires a General Assembly debate after any veto
2024	The Pact for the Future, adopted on 22 September, commits member states to continue Council reform

For wider context on Ankara's multilateral agenda, see the sister analyses from The Nations Compass and Polity Review.

Key Players & Positions

Four main positions structure the negotiations. Each is summarized here according to the group's own formal proposals and public statements; individual positions have evolved since 2005.

• The P5: All five have said at various times that they support some form of reform, but they differ on detail and each retains the Article 108 ratification power. The United States has publicly backed adding permanent seats for Africa without extending the veto to new members, along with a non-permanent seat for small island developing states, according to statements by US officials at the 2024 General Assembly. France and the United Kingdom have long supported permanent membership for the G4 and for African representation, and France has promoted voluntary veto restraint in cases of mass atrocities. Russia and China have said they favour greater representation for developing countries, especially from Africa, while stressing that any change needs broad consensus among members and, in China's case, wariness about particular candidates.
• The G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan): They seek six new permanent seats (including two for Africa) and four new non-permanent seats, for a Council of 25. They have said new permanent members would not exercise the veto, at least initially, pending a review.
• Uniting for Consensus (UfC): A group that includes Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Canada, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Argentina, Colombia, Malta and Türkiye. It opposes new permanent seats and proposes about ten additional elected seats, potentially with longer terms and immediate re-election, to widen access for all regions.
• The African Union (Common Position): The Ezulwini Consensus (2005) and Sirte Declaration demand two permanent African seats with full prerogatives, including the veto, plus five non-permanent seats, for a Council of 26. African states argue the continent has been historically wronged by its exclusion in 1945.

Other groupings, such as the small-state ACT group and a number of Latin American and Caribbean states, focus on veto restraint, working methods and transparency.

Comparison of reform models

Model	New permanent seats	New non-permanent seats	Veto	Resulting size	Main backers
Status quo	None	None	P5 only	15	Largely resisted by most members
G4	6 (incl. 2 for Africa)	4	Deferred for new members	25	Brazil, Germany, India, Japan
Uniting for Consensus	None	About 10, longer or re-electable terms	Seeks restraint or limits	About 25	Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Türkiye and others
African Common Position	2	5 (total new: 11)	Full veto for new permanent members, while calling for abolition in principle	26	African Union

The differences matter because no single model currently commands the two-thirds General Assembly majority plus P5 consent that formal amendment requires.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Ankara's doctrine, summarized from the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) materials, rests on legitimacy, representation and accountability.

• Legitimacy through representation. In his annual addresses to the UN General Assembly, available through the UN record and the Presidency's website, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly used the slogan 'The world is bigger than five.' Ankara argues that a body whose decisions bind all members must represent more than five states if its authority is to be broadly accepted.
• Against new permanent privileges. According to the Turkish MFA, Türkiye supports a reformed Council that is more representative, transparent, accountable and effective, and it participates in the Uniting for Consensus group. Ankara argues that adding permanent seats would deepen inequality among members; it prefers expanding elected membership, in which every state and region can compete and be held to account.
• Rotation as a principle. Erdoğan has called in General Assembly addresses for a more rotation-based system so that no state holds a permanent hold on decisions. Türkiye itself has served as a non-permanent member four times, most recently in 2009–2010, and Ankara cites that experience in support of the elected-seat model.
• Veto as the central problem. Ankara argues that repeated vetoes have paralysed the Council during crises, and Turkish officials have cited the Gaza war as an example. Türkiye welcomes General Assembly resolution 76/262 as a step toward accountability, while holding that structural limits on the veto remain necessary. For Ankara's wider position on Gaza, see Gaza and Humanitarian Diplomacy.
• Legal basis in the Charter. Ankara grounds its case in the Charter's own language. Article 2(1) establishes the sovereign equality of all members, and Article 24 states that the permanent members and others act on behalf of all members. Türkiye therefore argues that Council legitimacy depends on genuine delegation by the whole membership, not on the 1945 distribution of power. Ankara adds that Articles 108 and 109 make reform a question for all members, not only the P5.

Türkiye frames this agenda as part of a broader practice of mediation and multilateral problem-solving, from the Istanbul-hosted grain talks (how the Istanbul mechanism worked) to its strict application of the 1936 Montreux Convention (Article 19 explained). It also links reform to its UN Alliance of Civilizations co-sponsorship with Spain (Alliance of Civilizations explained). Further Turkish framings appear in The Political Anatomy and Regions & Powers.

Source Comparison

International commentary and Turkish primary sources often agree on the diagnosis and diverge on the remedy.

Issue	Common framing in international analysis	Framing in Turkish primary sources
Why reform stalls	Great-power veto over amendment and rivalry among aspirants (for example, Italy and Pakistan against Germany and India)	Ankara emphasises the unequal structure itself and argues the P5 and permanent-seat aspirants entrench hierarchy
Best model	Often treated as a choice between G4 permanence and the Africa Common Position, with UfC viewed as a blocking coalition	Ankara presents UfC as a pro-reform coalition favouring representation through elections
The veto	Seen as a tool of stability but also of paralysis, with limits discussed mainly as voluntary restraint	Erdoğan's addresses describe the veto as the main source of illegitimacy and cite crises such as Gaza
Türkiye's motive	Sometimes read as rivalry with specific neighbours or as rhetorical positioning	Turkish sources cite sovereign equality, Charter Article 2(1) and Türkiye's mediation record
Resolution 76/262	Seen as a modest transparency gain	Welcomed as a step, but not a substitute for structural reform

Readers should compare Erdoğan's General Assembly texts with the IGN co-chairs' documents and each group's formal proposals. For how we handle sourcing, see Editorial Principles and the Reader FAQ. Additional context is available from Record of Nations and Political Ledger.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• P5: The five permanent members of the Security Council with veto power under Article 27.
• Veto: The effect of a negative vote by any permanent member on a substantive resolution. The word itself is not in the Charter.
• G4: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, who support each other's bids for permanent seats.
• Uniting for Consensus (UfC): A group, including Türkiye, that favours enlarging elected membership and opposes new permanent seats. Critics sometimes call it the 'Coffee Club.'
• Ezulwini Consensus / African Common Position: The African Union's 2005 demand for two permanent and five additional non-permanent seats for Africa.
• IGN: Intergovernmental Negotiations, the General Assembly process on Council reform since 2009.

Related guides on this site: Intercivilization Review home, About Intercivilization Review, Anatolia, Crossroads of Civilizations, and Fact Check: Is Türkiye's Foreign Policy a 'Clash of Civilizations'?.

Perspective Note

Intercivilization Review presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal positions as a distinct viewpoint within the global debate, and does not claim to be a neutral wire service. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, Ottoman and Turkish state archives, and official statements, so readers can verify them independently.

Published by the Intercivilization Review Editorial Team.