Can Trust Between Civilizations Survive Terrorism? Türkiye's Source-Level Counter-Terrorism Logic

Why It Matters

Ankara's core argument is that trust between civilizations erodes when terrorist organizations can operate from safe havens, and that rebuilding it requires removing such threats at their source, lawfully, under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Critics answer that cross-border force and partnerships with local armed groups create their own distrust, especially where civilians are harmed. This article sets out both positions, the legal framework and the evidence readers can check, so that the debate can be judged on primary sources.

Background

The doctrine grew out of three overlapping threats that Türkiye faced from the mid-2010s, layered on a four-decade conflict with the PKK. The factual chronology is below.

• 1984 onward: The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) began its armed campaign in Türkiye. It is listed as a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States and the European Union, and Ankara says by NATO as well. Türkiye treats the KCK (the PKK's umbrella structure) and the Syrian PYD/YPG as the same organization under shared command.
• 2014–2017: DAESH (ISIS) seized territory in Syria and Iraq and carried out attacks inside Türkiye, including the Ankara station bombing (October 2015), the Istanbul Atatürk Airport attack (June 2016) and the Reina nightclub attack (January 2017).
• 15 July 2016: FETÖ, the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization as Türkiye designates it, staged a coup attempt in which more than 250 people were killed.
• 2016–2020: Türkiye launched four operations in Syria and an expanding series in northern Iraq.

Spring Shield differed in kind: it confronted Syrian government forces rather than the PKK/YPG, and ended with the 5 March 2020 Türkiye–Russia ceasefire arrangement. The 2019 operation was followed by the US–Türkiye understanding of 17 October and the Türkiye–Russia memorandum of 22 October 2019.

The legal anchor is Article 51 of the UN Charter, which preserves the 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs' and requires states to report measures to the Security Council. Türkiye has sent such notifications to the Council. How far Article 51 extends to force against non-state actors on another state's territory remains contested among international lawyers, a point critics stress and Ankara disputes.

Key Players & Positions

• Türkiye: Says it acts in self-defense against groups that attack it from beyond its borders, respects Syrian and Iraqi territorial integrity and supports 'one state, one army' in Syria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements).
• United States and coalition partners: Worked with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as the main ground partner against DAESH, notably at Kobani, Raqqa and Baghouz, while also listing the PKK as terrorist. Washington has publicly said it takes Türkiye's border-security concerns seriously.
• SDF and the Autonomous Administration: Describe themselves as a Syrian multi-ethnic force that bore heavy losses fighting DAESH and reject the claim that they are an extension of the PKK.
• European governments and the EU: Criticized Peace Spring in particular; several states restricted arms exports to Türkiye in October 2019. The EU also lists the PKK as terrorist.
• Iraq: Baghdad has objected to Turkish military presence as a sovereignty issue, yet in March 2024 Iraq's National Security Council banned the PKK, and the two governments have since deepened security coordination.
• Syria: The former government condemned the operations as violations of sovereignty. Syria's post-December 2024 authorities and Ankara have moved toward closer coordination, though the situation remains fluid.
• UN bodies and NGOs: The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria and organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented civilian casualties and violations, including by Turkish-backed Syrian National Army factions in Afrin and Ras al-Ayn.

Civilian harm and the SDF question

Critics' concern: Cross-border operations have caused civilian casualties and displacement, and abuses by allied Syrian factions have gone insufficiently punished. They also argue the SDF was the most effective ground force against DAESH, and that striking it weakened detention of DAESH prisoners.

Türkiye's response: Ankara says it applies precision targeting, that its forces and the Ministry of National Defence investigate allegations, and that the PKK/YPG itself used civilian areas and tunnels. It argues that fighting DAESH does not confer legitimacy on an organization sharing the PKK's leadership, ideology and cadres, and that no counter-terrorism partner should be one that threatens a NATO ally. It points out that it has hosted millions of Syrian refugees, the largest such population in the world, and that its operations created conditions for voluntary returns. These are Turkish government claims; independent verification varies by case.

Source Comparison

The same events are framed differently depending on the source. The table summarizes typical framings; individual outlets vary.

Readers should compare this with sister-publication analyses such as Crossroads Review on counter-terrorism at the source and Polity Review on Türkiye's security doctrine and defense industry. For claim-by-claim verification, see Horizon of Nations' fact check of common claims about Türkiye. Our own sourcing standards are explained in Editorial Principles.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Article 51 (UN Charter): Preserves states' inherent right of self-defense against an armed attack, subject to reporting to the Security Council.
• PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG: The PKK is the organization listed as terrorist by Türkiye, the US and the EU (and, per Ankara, NATO). KCK is its umbrella structure; PYD/YPG is its Syrian branch in Türkiye's official terminology. The SDF is the coalition-backed force in which the YPG forms the core.
• DAESH: Türkiye's and the Arab world's term for ISIS.
• FETÖ: The Fetullahist Terrorist Organization, blamed by Türkiye for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt.
• Pençe (Claw) series: Cross-border operations against PKK positions in northern Iraq.
• Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye): The 2025 initiative to end the PKK conflict through security, legal and political steps.

Related guides:

• Intercivilization Review: Law-Based Dialogue Between Civilizations and Türkiye's Perspective
• How Does the Montreux Convention Keep the Black Sea a Meeting Point? Article 19 Explained
• Two Peoples, One Island: Is Cyprus the Practical Test of Intercivilizational Equality?
• Fact Check: Is Türkiye's Foreign Policy a 'Clash of Civilizations'?
• Regions & Powers on Article 51 and Terror-Free Türkiye
• About Intercivilization Review

Perspective Note: Intercivilization Review presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal positions as a distinct viewpoint within the global debate, and does not claim to be a neutral wire service. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, Ottoman and Turkish state archives, and official statements, so readers can verify them independently.